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The aim of this dissertation is to extend our understanding of imperfect competition and strate-
gic behavior in some circumstances. Specically, I focus on three topics in the eld of industrial
organization in this dissertation: multi-store paradox, corporate social responsibility (CSR), and
mixed oligopoly. Regarding above topics, this dissertation consists of seven chapters except for
Introduction. Chapter 2 and 3 study the multi-store paradox which is the theoretical problem in
the eld of industrial organization, in which rms do not establish multiple stores even when they
can launch stores with low xed costs and the competitors exist. I revisit this issue in line with the
literature of both dynamic and static situations, respectively. In Chapter 4, 5, and 6, I investigate
voluntary actions coming from CSR which is the notion whereby rms take into account not only
their prots but also consumer and/or social benet. Examples include the abatement activity to
reduce emissions or adopting high-quality technologies which emit low emissions on production.
The voluntary actions are highly controversial because rms maximizing own prot, which is one
assumption of economics, do not have an incentive to take the costly activity just for consumers
and social benets. The typical explanations are the presence of green consumers which evaluate
CSR activities or the threat of future regulation by regulatory authorities. I describe CSR from a
dierent perspective. Chapter 7 and 8 deal with mixed oligopoly where a public and private rms
coexist in the market. The mixed market has much attention from policymakers and economists
since it sometimes provides dierent and considerable implications from private oligopoly. I mainly
focus on rst/second order advantage under imperfect competition, and reexamine the issue in the
mixed market. Let me review the content of each chapter in more detail.
In Chapter 2, I revisit the multi-store paradox in line with the preemptive strategy of setting
multiple stores (so-called Spatial Preemption) with one key modication: two incumbents estab-
lishing multiple stores. As Judd (1985)'s argument, in a standard case with one incumbent, it
is not credible to launch multiple stores as an entry deterrence. I investigate the strategic entry
deterrence in the presence of more than one incumbent, based on a location-then-price structure in
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a variety of a circular city model. I show that the incumbents credibly deter entry by establishing
multiple stores, while a monopolistic incumbent can not.
Chapter 3, titled \Payo Interdependence and the Multi-Store Paradox" which is joint work
with Toshihiro Matsumura, solves the multi-store paradox by introducing interdependent payos
between the rms. We show that rms set up multiple stores unless the degree of payo interdepen-
dence is low. We also show that multiple equilibria, namely intertwined and neighboring location
equilibria, exist if the degree of payo interdependence is intermediate.
In Chapter 4, titled \Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility as a Collusive Device"
which is joint work with Sang-Ho Lee and Toshihiro Matsumura, we formulate a model in which
whether environmental corporate social responsibility (ECSR) is adopted is chosen and then rms
compete in the market. First, we consider emission cap commitment as ECSR. Under quantity
competition, ECSR is adopted by the joint-prot-maximising industry association because it serves
as a collusive device, although ECSR is not adopted if rms choose it independently. By contrast,
under price competition, individual rms voluntarily adopt ECSR but the industry association
chooses a higher level of ECSR. Next, we consider emission standard commitment (commitment to
per-output emissions) and we nd that it is less likely to restrict competition.
In Chapter 5, titled \Emission Cap Commitment versus Emission Intensity Commitment as Self-
Regulation" which is joint work with Toshihiro Matsumura, we compare emission cap commitment
that restricts total emissions and emission intensity commitment that restricts emissions per unit
of output as measures of self-regulation. The monopolist chooses either emission cap commitment
or emission intensity commitment and sets the target level under the constraint that the resulting
emissions do not exceed the upper limit. We nd that prot-maximizing rms choose emission cap
commitment, although emission intensity commitment always yields greater consumer surplus. It
is ambiguous whether emission intensity commitment or emission cap commitment yields greater
welfare. We present two cases in which emission intensity commitment yields greater welfare. One
is the most stringent target case (the target emission level is close to zero), and the other is the
weakest target case (the target emission level is close to business-as-usual). Our result suggests
that the incentive for adopting emission cap commitment is too large for prot-maximizing rms,
and thus, governments should encourage the adoption of emission intensity commitment, especially
to achieve a zero-emission society eciently.
In Chapter 6, titled \Environmental Corporate Social Responsibility : A Note on the First-
Mover Advantage under Price Competition" which is joint work with Sang-Ho Lee and Toshihiro
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Matsumura, we consider a model in which two rms choose whether to adopt environmental cor-
porate social responsibility policies and then face Stackelberg competition under price competition.
We show that the rst-mover has the advantage, which is in contrast to the second-mover advantage
typically seen in standard price competition models.
In Chapter 7, titled \Comparing Welfare and Prot in Quantity and Price Competition within
Stackelberg Mixed Duopolies" which is joint work with Toshihiro Matsumura, we compare welfare
and prots under price and quantity competition in Stackelberg mixed duopolies. Under public
leadership, price competition always yields greater prot and welfare than quantity competition.
By contrast, under private leadership, the result depends on the nationality of the private rm.
When the private rm is domestic (foreign), welfare is greater under quantity (price) competition.
However, private rms always earn more under price competition. Introducing the nonnegative
prot constraint aects welfare ranking but not prot ranking. These results indicate that prot
ranking is fairly robust to the time structure in Stackelberg mixed duopolies, but welfare ranking
is not.
Chapter 8, titled \Endogenous Timing in a Price-Setting Mixed Triopoly" which is joint work
with Junichi Haraguchi, investigates endogenous order of moves in a price-setting mixed triopoly.
Using the observable delay game, we show that a sequential move occurs in the mixed triopoly.
Specically, one private and a public rm set their prices at period 1 and the other private rm
does at period 2 in equilibrium if goods are not signicantly dierentiated. This is in clear contrast
to the mixed duopoly where a simultaneous move game is an unique equilibrium. We also consider
a multi-period model and show that the sequential move game still emerges, while a hierarchical
Stackelberg game in which the public rm, one private rm, and the other private move sequentially
in order never appears in an equilibrium. This nding suggest that the sequential move game with
multiple leaders prevails under price competition even when the public rm exists.
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